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Abstract
We propose a new approach to code-based signatures that makes use in particular of
rank metric codes. When the classical approach consists in finding the unique preimage
of a syndrome through a decoding algorithm, we propose to introduce the notion of
mixed decoding of erasures and errors for building signature schemes. In that case the
difficult problem becomes, as is the case in lattice-based cryptography, finding a preimage
of weight above the Gilbert-Varshamov bound (case where many solutions occur) rather
than finding a unique preimage of weight below the Gilbert-Varshamov bound. The
paper describes RankSign: a new signature algorithm for the rank metric based on a
new mixed algorithm for decoding erasures and errors for the recently introduced Low
Rank Parity Check (LRPC) codes. We explain how it is possible (depending on choices
of parameters) to obtain a full decoding algorithm which is able to find a preimage of
reasonable rank weight for any random syndrome with a very strong probability. We
study the semantic security of our signature algorithm and show how it is possible to
reduce the unforgeability to direct attacks on the public matrix, so that no information
leaks through signatures. Finally, we give several examples of parameters for our scheme,
some of which with public key of size 11, 520 bits and signature of size 1728 bits. Moreover
the scheme can be very fast for small base fields.
Keys words: post-quantum cryptography, signature algorithm, code-based cryp-
tography, rank metric
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1 Introduction
In the last few years there has been a burst of activity in post-quantum cryptography. Interest
for the field has indeed increased significantly since the recent attacks on the discrete loga-
rithm problem in small characteristic [4], which shows that finding new attacks on classical
cryptographic systems is always a possibility and that it is important to have alternatives.
Among potential candidates for alternative cryptography, lattice-based and code-based cryp-
tography are strong candidates. In this paper we consider the signature problem for code-
based cryptography and especially rank metric based cryptography. The problem of finding
an efficient signature algorithm has been a major challenge for code-based cryptography since
its introduction in 1978 by McEliece. Signing with error-correcting codes can be achieved
in different ways: the CFS algorithm [8] considers extreme parameters of Goppa codes to
obtain a class of codes in which a non-negligeable part of random syndromes are invertible.
This scheme has a very small signature size, however it is rather slow and the public key is
very large. Another possibility is to use the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to turn a zero-knowledge
authentication scheme (like the Stern authentication scheme [30]) into a signature scheme.
This approach leads to very small public keys of a few hundred bits and is rather fast, but the
signature size in itself is large (about 100,000b), so that overall no wholly satisfying scheme
is known.
Classical code-based cryptography relies on the Hamming distance but it is also possible to
use another metric: the rank metric. This metric introduced in 1985 by Gabidulin [12] is
very different from the Hamming distance. The rank metric has received in recent years
very strong attention from the coding community because of its relevance to network coding.
Moreover, this metric can also be used for cryptography. Indeed it is possible to construct
rank-analogues of Reed-Solomon codes: the Gabidulin codes. Gabidulin codes inspired early
cryptosystems, like the GPT cryposystem ([13]), but they turned out to be inherently vul-
nerable because of the very strong structure of the underlying codes. More recently, by
considering an approach similar to NTRU [20](and also MDPC codes [26]) constructing a
very efficient cryptosystem based on weakly structured rank codes was shown to be pos-
sible [14]. However, in terms of signatures based on the rank metric, only systems that
use Fiat-Shamir are presently known [15]. Overall the main interest of rank-metric based
cryptography is that the complexity of the best known attack grows very quickly with the
size of parameters: Contrary to (Hamming) code-based or to lattice-based cryptography, it
is possible to obtain a general instance of the rank decoding problem with size only a few
thousands bits for (say) 280 security, when such parameter sizes can be obtained only with
additional structure (quasi-cyclic for instance) for code-based or lattice based cryptography.
An interesting point in code-based cryptography is that in general the security of the proto-
cols relies on finding small weight vectors below the Gilbert-Varshamov bound (the typical
minimum weight of a random code). This is noticeably different from lattice based cryptog-
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raphy for which it is very common for the security of a signature algorithm [19, 25] to rely
on the capacity to approximate a random vector far beyond its closest lattice vector element
(the Gap-CVP problem).
Traditionally, this approach was not developed for code-based cryptography since no de-
coding algorithm is known that decodes beyond the Gilbert-Varshamov bound: in fact this
problem is somewhat marginal for the coding community since it implies many possibilities
for decoding, while the standard objective is to find the most probable codeword or a short
list of most likely codewords.
Our contribution
The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of a new way of considering code-
based signatures, by introducing the idea that it is possible to invert a random syndrome
not below the Gilbert-Varshamov bound, but above it. The approach is similar in spirit to
what is done in lattice-based cryptography. We describe a new algorithm for LRPC codes,
a recently introduced class of rank codes, the new algorithm allows in practice to decode
both errors and (generalized) rank erasures. This new algorithm enables us to approximate
a syndrome beyond the Gilbert-Varshamov bound. The algorithm is a unique decoder (not
a list decoder) but can give different solutions depending on the choice of the erasure. We
shall explain precisely in which conditions one can obtain successful decoding for any given
syndrome and give the related probabilistic analysis. Based on this error/erasure algorithm
we propose a new signature scheme – RankSign. We give conditions for which no information
leakage is possible from real signatures obtained through our scheme. This is a significant
point since information leaking from real signatures was the weakness through which the
NTRUSign scheme came to be attacked [21, 7, 28]. Finally, we give examples of parameters:
they are rather versatile, and their size depends on a bound on the amount of potentially
leaked information. In some cases one obtains public keys of size 11,000 bits with signatures
of length 1728 bits, moreover the scheme is rather fast.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 recalls basic facts on the rank metric, Section 3
introduces LRPC codes and describes a new mixed algorithm for decoding (generalized)
erasures and errors, and studies its behaviour, Section 4 shows how to use them for cryptog-
raphy, and lastly, Section 5 and 6 consider security and parameters for these schemes. The
details of some proofs and attacks are also given in the appendix.
2 Background on rank metric codes and cryptography
2.1 Definitions and notation
Notation : Let q be a power of a prime p, m an integer and let Vn be a n dimensional
vector space over the finite field GF(qm). Let β = (β1, . . . , βm) be a basis of GF (q
m) over
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GF (q).
Let Fi be the map from GF (q
m) to GF (q) where Fi(x) is the i-th coordinate of x in the
basis β.
To any v = (v1, . . . , vn) in Vn we associate the matrix v ∈ Mm,n(Fq) in which vi,j = Fi(vj).
The rank weight of a vector v can be defined as the rank of the associated matrix v. If we
name this value rank(v) we can define a distance between two vectors x, y through the formula
dr(x, y) = rank(x− y). Isometry for rank metric: in the rank metric context, the notion of
isometry differs from the Hamming distance context: while for Hamming distance isometries
are permutation matrices, for the rank metric isometries are invertible n×n matrices on the
base field GF (q) (indeed these matrices, usually denoted by P , do not change the rank of a
codeword). We refer to [23] for more details on codes for the rank distance.
A rank code C of length n and dimension k over GF (qm) is a subspace of dimension k of
GF (qm) viewed as a (rank) metric space. The minimum rank distance of the code C is the
minimum rank of non-zero vectors of the code. In the following, C is a rank metric code of
length n and dimension k over GF (qm). The matrix G denotes a k × n generator matrix of
C and H one of its parity check matrices.
Definition 1. Let x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) ∈ GF (q
m)n be a vector of rank r. We denote E the
GF (q)-sub vector space of GF (qm) generated by x1, x2, · · · , xn. The vector space E is called
the support of x.
Remark: The notion of support of a codeword for the Hamming distance and for the the
one introduced in definition 1 are different but they share a common principle: in both cases,
suppose one is given a syndrome s and that there exists a low weight vector x such that
H.xt = s, then, if the support of x is known, it is possible to recover all the coordinates
values of x by solving a linear system.
Definition 2. Let e be an error vector of rank r and error support space E. We call
generalized erasure of dimension t of the error e, a subspace T of dimension t of its
error support E.
The notion of erasure for Hamming distance corresponds to knowing a particular position of
the error vector (hence some partial information on the support), in the rank distance case,
the support of the error being a subspace E, the equivalent notion of erasure (also denoted
generalized erasure) is therefore the knowledge of a subspace T of the error support E.
2.2 Bounds for rank metric codes
The classical bounds for the Hamming metric have straightforward rank metric analogues,
since two of them are of interest for the paper we recall them below.
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2.2.1 Rank Gilbert-Varshamov bound [GVR]
The number of elements S(m, q, t) of a sphere of radius t in GF (qm)n, is equal to the number
of m× n q-ary matrices of rank t. For t = 0 S0 = 1, for t ≥ 1 we have (see [23]):
S(n,m, q, t) =
t−1∏
j=0
(qn − qj)(qm − qj)
qt − qj
From this we deduce the volume of a ball B(n,m, q, t) of radius t in GF (qm) to be:
B(n,m, q, t) =
t∑
i=0
S(n,m, q, i).
In the linear case the Rank Gilbert-Varshamov bound GV R(n, k,m, q) for a [n, k] linear code
over GF (qm) is then defined as the smallest integer t such that B(n,m, q, t) ≥ qm(n−k).
The Gilbert-Varshamov bound for a rank code C with dual matrix H corresponds to the
smallest rank weight r for which, for any syndrome s, there exists on the average a word x
of rank weight r such that H.xt = s. To give an idea of the behaviour of this bound, it can
be shown that, asymptotically in the case m = n ([23]): GV R(n,k,m,q)
n
∼ 1−
√
k
n
.
2.2.2 Singleton bound
The classical Singleton bound for a linear [n, k] rank code of minimum rank r over GF (qm)
works in the same way as for Hamming linear codes (by finding an information set) and
reads r ≤ 1+n−k: in the case when n > m this bound can be rewritten as r ≤ 1+⌊ (n−k)m
n
⌋
[23]. Codes achieving this bound are called Maximum Rank Distance codes (MRD).
2.3 Cryptography and rank codes
The main use of rank codes in the cryptographic context is through the rank analogue of
the classical syndrome decoding problem.
Maximum Likelihood - Rank Syndrome Decoding problem (ML-RSD) Let H be
an (n − k) × n matrix over GF (qm) with k ≤ n, s ∈ GF (qm)n−k . The problem is to find
the smallest weight r such that rank(x) = r and Hxt = s.
The computational complexity of this problem, which was unkown for more than 20 years,
was recently assessed theoretically in [17]. In this paper a randomized reduction to the
Hamming distance Syndrome Decoding problem distance is given. More precisely, it is
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proved that if there exists a polynomial algorithm which solves the RSD problem, then NP
⊂ RP, which is very unlikely. Results also extend to the case of approximation of the rank
distance of a code by a constant.
Besides the theoretical hardness of the RSD problem, practical attacks on the problem have
a complexity which increases very quickly with the parameters.
There exist several types of generic attacks on the problem:
• combinatorial attacks: these attacks are usually the best ones for small values of q
(typically q = 2) and when n and k are not too small (typically 30 and more): when q
increases, the combinatorial aspect makes them less efficient. The first non-trivial attack on
the problem was proposed by Chabaud and Stern [6] in 1996, then in 2002 Ourivski and
Johannson [27] improved the previous attack and proposed a new attack: however, these
two attacks did not take account of the value of n in the exponent. They were generalized
recently in [16] by Gaborit et al. in (n − k)3m3q(r−1)⌊
(k+1)m
n
⌋)) and take the value of n into
account and were used to break some repaired versions of the GPT cryposystem.
• algebraic attacks and Levy-Perret attack: the particular nature of the rank metric
makes it a natural field for algebraic attacks and solving by Groebner basis, since these
attack are largely independent of the value of q and in some cases may also be largely
independent of m. These attacks are usually the most efficient when q increases and when
the parameters are not too high (say less than 30). There exist different types of algebraic
equations settings: the first one by Levy and Perret [22] in 2006 considers a quadratic setting
by taking as unknowns the support E of the error and the error coordinates regarding E,
there is also the Kernel attack by [9] and the minor approach which consists in considering
multivariate equations of degree r+1 obtained from minors of matrices [10], and more recently
the annulator setting by Gaborit et al. in [16] (which is valid on certain type of parameters
but may not be independent of m). In our context for some of the parameters considered
in the end of the paper, the Levy-Perret attack is the most efficient one to consider. The
attack works as follows: suppose one starts from an [n, k] rank code over GF (qm) and we
want to solve the RSD problem for an error e of rank weight r, the idea of the attack is
to consider the support E of e as unknowns together with the error coordinates, it gives
nr+m(r− 1) unknowns and m(2(n− k)− 1) equations from the syndrome equations. One
obtains a quadratic system, on which one can use Groebner basis. All the complexities for
Grobner basis attacks are estimated through the very nice program of L. Bettale [5]. In
practice this attack becomes too costly whenever r ≥ 4 for not too small n and k.
The case of more than one solution: approximating beyond the GVR bound
In code based cryptography there is usually only one solution to the syndrome problem (for
instance for the McEliece scheme), now in this situation we are interested in the case when
there are a large number of solutions. This case is reminiscent of lattice-based cryptography
when one tries to approximate as much as possible a given syndrome by a word of weight as
6
low as possible.
This motivates us to introduce a new problem which corresponds to finding a solution to
the general decoding problem for the case when the weight of the word associated to the
syndrome is greater than the GVR bound, in that case there may be several solutions, and
hence the term decoding does not seem well chosen. Notice that in a lattice cryptography
context, it corresponds to the case of Gap-CVP, which does not make sense here, since it
implies a multiplicative gap.
Approximate - Rank Syndrome Decoding problem (App-RSD) Let H be an (n −
k)×n matrix over GF (qm) with k ≤ n, s ∈ GF (qm)n−k and let r be an integer. The problem
is to find a solution of rank r such that rank(x) = r and Hxt = s.
Even though the recent results of [17] show that the problem of approximation of the rank
distance remains hard, there are cases for which the problem is easy, that we want to consider.
It is helpful to first consider the situation of a binary linear [n, k] Hamming metric code.
Given a random element of length n − k of the syndrome space, we know that with high
probability there exists a word that has this particular syndrome and whose weight is on the
GV bound. This word is usually hard to find, however. Now what is the lowest minimum
weight for which it is easy to find such a word ? A simple approach consists in taking n− k
random column of the parity-check matrix (a potential support of the solution word) and
inverting the associated matrix, multiplying by the syndrome gives us a solution of weight
(n− k)/2 on average. In fact it is difficult to do better than this without a super-polynomial
increase in complexity.
Now for the rank metric, one can apply the same approach: suppose one starts from a random
[n, k] code over GF (qm) and that one searches for a word of small rank weight r with a given
syndrome. One fixes (as in the Hamming case) a potential support for the word - here a
subspace of dimension r of GF (qm)- and one tries to find a solution. Let x = (x1, · · · , xn)
be a solution vector, so that H.xt = s. If we consider the syndrome equations induced in the
small field GF (q), there are nr unknowns and m(n−k) equations. Hence it is possible (with
a good probability) to solve the system whenever nr ≥ m(n − k), meaning it is possible to
find in probabilistic polynomial time a solution to a typical instance of the RSD problem
whenever r ≥ ⌈m(n−k)
n
⌉, which corresponds to the Singleton bound. This proves the following
proposition:
Proposition 3. There is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that solves random in-
stances of the App-RSD problem in polynomial time when r ≥ ⌈m(n−k)
n
⌉.
For a rank weight r below this bound, the best known attacks are, as in the Hamming
distance case, obtained by considering the cost of finding a word of rank r divided by the
number of potential solutions: B(n,k,m,q)
qm(n−k)
. In practice the complexity we find is coherent with
this.
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3 Approximating a random syndrome beyond the GVR bound
with LRPC codes
3.1 Decoding algorithm in rank metric
The rank metric has received a lot of attention in the context of network coding [29]. There
exist very few algorithms, however, for decoding codes in the rank metric. The most well-
known [n, k] codes which are decodable are the Gabidulin codes [12]. These codes can correct
up to n−k2 errors, and have been proposed for encryption: but since they cannot decode up to
the GVR bound, they do not seem suitable for full decoding in the spirit of [8] for signature
algorithms. Another more recent family of decodable codes are the LRPC codes [14], these
codes are defined through a low rank matrix.
Definition 4. A Low Rank Parity Check (LRPC) code of rank d, length n and dimension k
over GF (qm) is a code defined by an (n − k) × n parity check matrix H = (hij), such that
all its coordinates hij belong to the same GF (q)-subspace F of dimension d of GF (q
m). We
denote by {F1, F2, · · · , Fd} a basis of F .
These codes can decode with a good probability up to n−k
d
errors, they can be used for
encryption [14], but since they can decode only up to n−k2 errors at best, they also seems
unsuitable for signature algorithms.
3.2 Using LRPC codes to approximate a random syndrome beyond the
GVR bound
3.2.1 High level overview
The traditional approach for decoding random syndromes, that is used by the CFS scheme
for instance, consists in taking advantage of the decoding properties of a code (e.g. a Goppa
code) and in considering parameters for which the proportion of decodable vectors – the
decodable density – is not too low. For the Hamming metric, this approach leads to very
flat dual matrices, i.e., codes with high rate and very low Hamming distance. In the rank
metric case, this approach leads to very small decodable densities and does not work in
practice. However, it is possible to proceed otherwise. It turns out that the decoding
algorithm of LRPC codes can be adapted so that it is possible to decode not only errors
but also (generalized) erasures. This new decoding algorithm allows us to decode more rank
errors since the support is then partially known. In that case since the size of the balls
depends directly on the dimension of the support, it leads to a dramatic increase of the size
of the decodable balls. Semantically, what happens is that the signer can fix an erasure
space, which relaxes the condition for finding a preimage. This approach works because in
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the particular case of our algorithm, it is possible to consider the erasure space at no cost
in terms of error correction: to put it differently, the situation for LRPC is different from
traditional Hamming metric codes for which “an error equals two erasures”.
In practice it is possible to find parameters (not flat at all) for which it is possible to decode
a random syndrome with the constraint that its support contains a fixed random subspace.
Fixing part of the rank-support of the error, (the generalized erasure) allows us more rank-
errors. For suitable parameters, the approach works then as follows: for a given random
syndrome-space element s, one chooses a random subspace T of fixed dimension t (a gener-
alized erasure of Definition 2), and the algorithm returns a small rank-weight word, whose
rank-support E contains T , and whose syndrome is the given element s. Of course, there is
no unicity of the error e since different choices of T lead to different errors e, which implies
that the rank of the returned error is above the GVR bound: it is however only just above
the GVR bound for the right choice of parameters.
3.2.2 LRPC decoding with errors and generalized erasures
Setting: Let an [n, k] LRPC code be defined by an (n−k)×n parity-check matrix H whose
entries lie in a space F ⊂ GF (qm) of small dimension d. Let t and r′ be two parameters
such that
r′ ≤
n− k
d
.
Set r = t + r′. Given an element of the syndrome space s, we will be looking for a rank
r vector e of GF (qm)n with syndrome s. We first look for an acceptable subspace E of
dimension r of GF (qm) and then solve the linear system H.et = s where e ∈ En. To this end
we choose a random subspace T of dimension t of GF (qm) and impose the condition T ⊂ E.
The subspace T being fixed, we now describe the set of decodable elements of the syndrome
space. We will then see how to decode them.
Definition 5. Let F1 and F2 be two fixed linearly independent elements of the space F . We
shall say that an element s ∈ GF (qm)n−k of the syndrome space is T -decodable if there exists
a rank r subspace E of GF (qm) satisfying the following conditions.
(i) dim〈FE〉 = dimF dimE,
(ii) dim(F−11 〈FE〉 ∩ F
−1
2 〈FE〉) = dimE,
(iii) the coordinates of s all belong to the space 〈FE〉 and together with the elements of the
space 〈FT 〉 they generate the whole of 〈FE〉.
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Decoding algorithm. We now argue that if a syndrome s is T -decodable, we can effec-
tively find e of rank r such that H.et = s. We first determine the required support space E.
Since the decoder knows the subspaces F and T , he has access to the product space 〈FT 〉.
He can then construct the subspace S generated by 〈FT 〉 and the coordinates of s. Condition
(iii) of T -decodability ensures that the subspace S is equal to 〈FE〉 for some E, and since
F−11 〈FE〉 ∩ F
−1
2 〈FE〉 ⊃ E,
condition (ii) implies that E is uniquely determined and that the decoder recovers E by
computing the intersection of subspaces F−11 S ∩ F
−1
2 S.
It remains to justify that once the subspace E is found, we can always find e of support E
such that H.et = s. This will be the case if the mapping
En → 〈FE〉n−k (1)
e 7→ H.et
can be shown to be surjective. Extend {F1, F2} to a basis {F1, · · · , Fd} of F and let
{E1, · · · , Er} be a basis of E. Notice that the system H.e
t = s can be rewritten formally
as a linear system in the small field GF (q) where the coordinates of e and the elements of
H are written in the basis {E1, · · · , Er} and {F1, · · · , Fd} respectively, and where the syn-
drome coordinates are written in the product basis {E1.F1, · · · , Er.Fd}. We therefore have
a linear system with nr unknowns and (n− k)rd equations over GF (q) that is defined by an
nr × (n − k)rd formal matrix Hf (say) whose coordinates are functions only of H (see [14]
for more details on how to obtain Hf from H).
We now see that the matrix H can be easily chosen so that the matrix Hf is of maximal rank
nr, which makes the mapping (1) surjective, for any subspace E of dimension d satisfying
condition (i) of T -decodability.
Remarks:
1. For applications, we will consider only the case where nr = (n − k)rd, meaning that
the mapping (1) is always one-to-one.
2. The system H.et = s can be formally inverted and stored in a pre-processing phase,
so that the decoding complexity is only that of multiplication by a square matrix of
length nr, rather than a cubic inversion.
3. In principle, the decoder could derive the support E by computing
E = F−11 S ∩ · · · ∩ F
−1
d S (2)
rather than simply E = F−11 S ∩F
−1
2 S, and the procedure would work in the same way
in cases when (2) holds but not the simpler condition (ii). This potentially increases
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the set of decodable syndromes, but the gain is somewhat marginal and condition (ii)
makes the forthcoming analysis simpler. For similar reasons, when conditions (i)–(iii)
are not all satisfied, we do not attempt to decode even if there are cases when it stays
feasible.
Figure 1 summarizes the decoding algorithm. Note that the decoder can easily check condi-
tions (i)–(iii), and that a decoding failure is declared when they are not satisfied.
Input: T = 〈T1, · · · , Tt〉 a subspace of GF (q
m) of dimension t, H an
(n − k) × n matrix with elements in a subspace F = 〈F1, · · · , Fd〉 of
dimension d, and s ∈ GF (qm)n−k.
Output: a vector e = (e1, . . . en) such that s = H.e
t, with ei ∈ E, E a
subspace of dimension dimE = r = t+ n−k
d
satisfying T ⊂ E.
1. Syndrome computations
a) Compute a basis B = {F1T1, · · · , FdTt} of the product space
〈F.T 〉.
b) Compute the subspace S = 〈B ∪ {s1, · · · , sn−k}〉.
2. Recovering the support E of the error
Compute the support of the error E = F−11 S∩F
−1
2 S, and compute
a basis {E1, E2, · · · , Er} of E.
3. Recovering the error vector e = (e1, . . . , en)
For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, write ei =
∑n
i=1 eijEj, solve the system H.e
t = s,
where the equations H.et and the syndrome coordinates si are
written as elements of the product space P = 〈E.F 〉 in the ba-
sis {F1E1, · · · , F1Er, · · · , FdE1, · · · , FdEr}. The system has nr
unknowns (the eij) in GF (q) and (n − k)rd equations from the
syndrome.
Figure 1: Algorithm 1: a general errors/erasures decoding algorithm for LRPC codes
3.3 Proportion of decodable syndromes for unique decoding of LRPC
codes
Signature algorithms based on codes all inject the message space in some way into the
syndrome space and then decode them to form a signature. We should therefore estimate
the proportion of decodable syndromes. The classical decoding approach tells us to look for
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a preimage by H that sits on the Gilbert-Varshamov bound: for typical random codes, a
preimage typically exists and is (almost) unique. Computing such a preimage is a challenge,
however. In our case, we are looking for a preimage above the Gilbert-Varshamov bound, for
which many preimages exist, but for a fixed (erasure) subspace T , decoding becomes unique
again. In the following, we count the number of T -decodable syndromes and show that for
some adequate parameter choices, their proportion can be made to be close to 1. It will be
convenient to use the following notation.
Definition 6. For a subspace T of GF (qm) of dimension t, denote by E(T ) the number of
subspaces of dimension r = r′ + t that contain T .
Lemma 7. We have
E(T ) =
r′−1∏
i=0
(
qm−t−i − 1
qi+1 − 1
)
Proof. Consider the case where r = t+1, we need to construct distinct subspaces of dimension
t+1 containing T . This can be done by adjoining an element of GF (qm) modulo the subspace
T , which gives (qm − qt)/(qt+1 − qt) = (qm−t − 1)/(q − 1) possibilities. Now any subspace
of dimension t+ 1 contains qt+1 − 1 supspaces of dimension t containing T . A repetition of
this approach r′ − 1 times gives the formula. (see also [24] p.630).
Theorem 8. The number T (t, r, d,m) of T -decodable syndromes satisfies the upper bound:
T (t, r, d,m) ≤ E(T )qrd(n−k).
Furthermore, under the conditions r(2d− 1) ≤ m and
dim〈FT 〉 = dimF dimT, (3)
dim(F−11 F + F
−1
2 F ) = 2dimF − 1 = 2d− 1, (4)
we also have the lower bound:
(
1−
1
q − 1
)2
E(T )qrd(n−k) ≤ T (t, r, d,m).
Note that condition (4) depends only on the subspace F and can be ensured quite easily
when designing the matrix H. Random spaces F with random elements F1 and F2 will
typically have this property. Condition (3) depends on the choice of the subspace T : as
will be apparent from Lemma below, for a random subspace T condition (3) holds with
probability very close to 1.
The complete proof of Theorem 8 is given in Appendix A.
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Remarks:
1. It can be shown with a finer analysis that the term (1− 1(q − 1))2 in the lower bound
can be improved to a quantity close to 1− 1(q − 1).
2. For large q, Theorem 8 shows that, for most choices of T , the density of T -decodable
syndromes essentially equals
E(T )qrd(n−k)
qm(n−k)
≈ q(r−t)(m−r)+(n−k)(rd−m). (5)
Remarkably, it is possible to choose sets of parameters (m, t, r, d), with (n − k) = d(r − t),
such that the exponent in (5) equals zero, which gives a density very close to 1.
Example of parameters with density almost 1: For q = 28,m = 18, n = 16, k = 8, t =
2, r′ = 4, the algorithm decodes up to r = t + r′ = 6 for a fixed random partial support T
of dimension 2. The GVR bound for a random [16, 8] code with m = 18 is 5, the Singleton
bound is 8, we see that the decoding radius 6 is therefore just above the GVR bound at 5 and
smaller than the Singleton bound at 8. Moreover one can notice that if parameters (m, t, r, d)
satisfy the two equations (r− t)(m−r)+(n−k)(rd−m) = 0 and (n−k) = d(r− t) (the case
for which the density is almost 1), then for any integer α greater than 1, the parameter set
(αm,αt, αr, d) satisfies the same equations, and hence for a given d one obtains an infinite
family of parameters with density almost 1.
Decoding in practice. In practice it easy enough to find sets of parameters for which the
density of decodable syndromes is very close to 1, i.e. such that (r− t)(m− r)+ (n−k)(rd−
m) = 0.
4 RankSign, a signature scheme for the rank metric based on
augmented LRPC codes
We saw in the previous section how to construct a matrix H of an LRPC code, with a
unique support decoding, which opens the way for a signature algorithm. In practice the
best decoding results are obtained for d = 2: the natural strategy is to define for the public
key a matrix H ′ = AHP , where A is a random (n − k) × (n − k) invertible matrix in the
extension field and P is an invertible n × n matrix in the small field. However, it is easily
possible for a cryptanalyst to recover the words of small weight d = 2 in H ′ and it is therefore
necessary to hide the matrix H in another way. In what follows we present a simple type of
masking: RankSign which consists in adding a few random columns to H.
Suppose one has a fixed support T of dimension t. We consider the public matrix H ′ =
A(R|H)P with R a random (n − k) × t′ matrix in GF (qm). We will typically take t′ = t
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but one could envisage other values of t′. We call augmented LRPC codes such codes with
parity-check matrices H ′ = A(R|H)P .
Starting from a partial support T that has been randomly chosen and is then fixed, the
signature consists in decoding not a random s but the syndrome s′ = s−R.(e1, · · · , et)
t for
ei random independent elements of T .
The overall rank of the solution vector e is still r = t + r′. the masking gives us that the
minimum rank-weight of the code generated by the rows of H ′ is t+ d rather than purely d:
therefore recovering the hidden structure involves finding relatively large minimum weight
vectors in a code. In practice we consider d = 2 andH is a n/2×nmatrix with all coordinates
in a space F of dimension 2. Moreover for {F1, F2} a basis of F , we choose the matrix H
such that when H is written in the basis {F1, F2}, one obtains a n× n invertible matrix (of
maximal rank) over GF (q). It can be done easily. Figure 2 describes the scheme, where ||
denotes concatenation.
1. Secret key: an augmented LRPC code over GF (qm) with parity-
check matrix (R|H) of size (n−k)×(n+t) which can decode r′ errors
and t generalized erasures: a randomly chosen (n−k)×(n−k) matrix
A that is invertible in GF (qm) a randomly chosen (n + t) × (n + t)
matrix P invertible in GF (q).
2. Public key: the matrix H ′ = A(R|H)P , a small integer value l, a
hash function hash.
3. Signature of a message M :
a) initialization: seed ← {0, 1}l , pick t random independent elements
(e1, · · · , et) of GF (q
m)
b) syndrome: s← hash(M ||seed) ∈ GF (qm)n−k
c) decode by the LRPC matrix H, the syndrome s′ = A−1.sT −
R.(e1, · · · , et)
T with erasure space T = 〈e1, · · · , et〉 and r
′ errors by
Algorithm 1.
d) if the decoding algorithm works and returns a word (et+1, · · · , en+t)
of weight r = t + r′, signature=((e1, · · · , en+t).(P
T )−1, seed), else
return to a).
4. Verification: Verify that Rank(e) = r = t + r′ and H ′.eT = s =
hash(M ||seed).
Figure 2: The RankSign signature algorithm
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Parameters: Public key size: (k + t)(n− k)mLog2(q) Signature size: (m+ n+ t)rLog2(q).
The cost of the decoding algorithm is quadratic because of preprocessing of H−1f , hence the
major cost comes from the linear algebra over the large field GF (qm).
Signature complexity: (n − k) × (n + t) operations in GF (qm). Verification complexity:
(n− k)× (n+ t) operations in GF (qm).
The length l of the seed can be taken equal to 80
Log2(q)
for instance.
5 Security analysis of the scheme
5.1 Security of augmented LRPC codes
In the previous section we defined augmented-LRPC with dual matrix H ′ = A(R|H)P , we
now formulate the problem Ind-LRPC codes (Ind-LRPC) on the security of these codes:
Problem [Ind-LRPC] The augmented LRPC codes are indistinguishable from random
codes.
We know make the following assumption that we will discuss below:
Assumption: the Ind-LRPC problem is difficult.
Discussion on the assumption: The family of augmented LRPC codes is not of course a
family of random codes, but they are weakly structured codes: the main point being that
they have a parity-check matrix one part of which consists only of low rank coordinates the
other part consisting of random entries. The attacker never has direct access to the LRPC
matrix H, which is hidden by the augmented part.
The minimum weight of augmented LRPC codes is smaller than the GVR bound, hence
natural attacks consist in trying to use their special structure to attack them. There exist
general attacks for recovering the minimum weight of a code (see Section 2.3) but these
attacks have a fast increasing complexity especially when the size of the base field GF (q)
increases. We first list obvious classical attacks for recovering the structure of augmented-
LRPC codes and then describe specific attacks.
• Previously known structural attacks for rank codes. The main structural attack for the rank
metric is the Overbeck attack on the GPT cryptosystem. The attack consists in considering
concatenated public matrices Gq, Gq
2
, ..., Gq
n−k−1
, in that case the particular structure of
Gabidulin codes enables one to find a concatenated matrix with a rank default; this is due
to the particular structure of the Gabidulin codes and the fact that for Gabidulin codes Gq
i
is very close to Gq
i+1
. In the case of LRPC codes, since the rows are taken randomly in a
small space, this attack makes no sense, and cannot be generalized.
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• Dual attack: attack on the dual matrix H ′. Another approach consists in directly finding
words of small weight induced by the structure of the code, from which one can hope to
recover the global structure. For augmented LRPC codes, the rank of the small weight
words is d + t: d for LRPC and t for the masking. This attack becomes very hard when t
increases, even for low t. For instance for t = 2 and d = 2 it gives a minimum weight of 4,
which for most parameters n and k is already out of reach of the best known attacks on the
rank syndrome decoding problem (see Section 2.3).
• Attack on the isometry matrix P. Remember that for rank metric codes, the isometry
matrix is not a permutation matrix but an invertible matrix over the base field GF (q). The
attacker can then try to guess the action of P on H, since d is usually small negating this
action may allow to attack directly a code of rank d. Since d is small it is enough to guess
the resulting action of P on n − k + 3 columns by considering only the action of P coming
from the first t columns of the matrix R – the only columns which may increase the rank –
it means guessing (n− k + 3) × t elements of GF (q) (since coordinates of P are in GF (q)),
hence a complexity of q(n−k+3)t. In general this attack is not efficient as soon as q is not
small (for instance q = 256).
• Attack on recovering the support. An attacker may also try to recover directly an element of
the support. For instance in the case of d = 2, for F the error support generated by {F1, F2},
up to a constant one can rewrite F as generated by 1 and F2.F
−1
1 . Then the attacker can try
to guess the particular element F2.F
−1
1 , recover F and solve a linear system in the coordinates
of the elements of H. The complexity of this attack is therefore qm.(nd)3. Even in the most
favourable case when d = 2 this attack is exponential and becomes infeasible for q not too
small.
• Differential support attack. It is also possible to search for an attack directly based on the
specific structure of the augmented LRPC codes. The general idea of the differential support
attack is to consider the vector space V on the base field GF (q) generated by the elements of a
row of the augmented matrix H ′ and to find a couple (x, x′) of elements of V such that x
′
x
∈ F
the support of the LRPC code. The complexity of the attack is at least q(n−k)(d−1)+t, the
detail of the attack can be found in Appendix B. In practice this exponential attack is often
the best attack for recovering the structure of the code and distinguishing the augmented
LRPC code from a random code.
Conclusion on the hardness of the Ind-LRPC problem
Even though there are many possible strategies for attacking the Ind-LRPC problem, in
particular because of the rich structure of rank metric, the above discussion of general known
attacks shows that they are all exponential with a strong dependency on the size of q.
Moreover, we also considered very specific attacks (like the differential support attack) related
to the particular structure of the augmented LRPC codes. This analysis seems to show that
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the Ind-LRPC problem is indeed difficult, with all known attacks being exponential. In
practice it is easy to find parameters which resist all these attacks.
5.2 Information leakage
The attacks considered above concerned the case where no additional information was known
beside the public parameters. Often the most efficient attacks on signatures is to recover
the hidden structure of the public key by using information leaking from real signatures.
This for instance is what happened in the case of NTRUSign: the secret key is not directly
attacked, but the information leaked from real signatures enables one to recover successfully
the hidden structure. We show below that with our masking scheme no such phenomenon
can occur, since we prove that, if an attacker can break the signature scheme for public
augmented matrices with the help of information leaking from a number of (approximately)
q real signatures, then he can also break the scheme just as efficiently *without* any authentic
signatures.
Theorem 9 below states the unleakibility of signatures. It essentially states that valid sig-
natures leak no information on the secret key. More precisely, there exists a polynomial
time probabilistic algorithm that takes as input the public matrix H ′ and produces couples
(m,σ), where m is a message and σ a valid signature for m and that, under the random
oracle model, has the same probability distribution as couples (message, signature) output
by the authentic signature algorithm, and is therefore indistinguishable from them. There-
fore, whatever forgery can be achieved from the knowledge of H ′ and a list of valid signed
messages, can be simulated and reproduced with the public matrix H ′ as only input.
Theorem 9. : For any algorithm A that leads to a forged signature using N ≤ q/2 authentic
signatures, there is an algorithm A′ with the same complexity that leads to a forgery using
only the public key as input and without any authentic signatures.
Proof. see Appendix C.
5.3 Unforgeability
Our main Theorem 9 and its proof, show that it is possible to simulate (message,signature)
couples with the same probability distribution as valid (message,signature) couples whenever
the number of such couples is less than q/2. Therefore, given less than q/2 signatures (chosen
or given), an attacker cannot do better than an attacker who knows only the public key (the
matrix of a code). And in that case, under the Ind-LRPC indistinguashability assumption of
augmented LRPC codes with random codes, it implies that forging a false signature in the
ROM (i.e. being able to approximate a random syndrome for the augmented LRPC class
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of codes) means being able to decode a random rank code. Parameters of the scheme are
hence chosen with large q and suitable code parameters for which it is difficult to decode a
random code and to distinguish augmented LRPC codes from random codes.
6 Practical security and parameters
Below we give in Table 1 some examples of parameters. The parameters are adjusted to resist
all previously known attacks. The security reduction holds for up to q/2 signatures, hence
if one considers q = 240 it means we are protected against leakage for up to 240 obtained
authentic signatures. Such an amount of signatures is very difficult to obtain in real life,
moreover if one multiplies by the amount of time necessary to obtain a signature (about 230
for q = 240) we clearly see that obtaining such a number of authentic signatures is out of
reach, and it justifies our security reduction.
We also give parameters for q lower than 240: in that case the reduction is weaker in the
sense that it does not exclude a leaking attack for sufficiently many signatures. However,
such a leaking attack seems difficult to obtain anyway, and these parameters can be seen as
challenges for our system.
In the table the considered codes are [n+ t, k+ t] codes which give a signature of rank r. The
dual code H ′ is a [n+t, n−k] code which contains words of rank d+t. In the table ‘LP’ stands
for the logarithmic complexity of the algebraic Levy-Perret attack, for instance in the case
n = 16, one gets a [18, 8] code in which one searches for words of rank 4, it gives 270 quadratic
equations for 126 unknowns, with a theoretical complexity of 2120 from [5] (remember that for
a random quadratic system over GF (2) with n unknowns and 2n equations the complexity
is roughly 2n operations in the base field GF (2)). The complexity of a direct attack for
searching low weight words of weight d + t with combinatorial attacks (see Section 2.3) is
given in ‘Dual’. Finally, ‘DS’ stands for the differential support attack of Section 5.1 and
‘DA’ stands for the direct attack on the signature in which one searches directly for a forgery
for a word of weight r in a [n+ t, k+ t] code. In the table the number of augmented columns
is usually t except for the last example for which one adds 2 columns rather than t = 5.
The analysis of the security complexities shows that the best attack (in bold in the table)
depends on the given parameters: when q is large the algebraic attacks are better since they
do not really depends on q, when d increases the decoding algorithm is less efficient and then
one get closer to the Singleton bound and direct forgery for the signature becomes easier.
For other parameters, usually the specific structural differential support attack DS is better.
Implementation: We implemented our scheme in a non optimized way, the results we
obtained showed that for small q the scheme was very fast, when q increases, one has to
consider the cost of multiplication in GF (q), however for q = 28 or q = 216 some optimized
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n n-k m q d t r’ r GVR Singleton pk(bits) sign(bits) LP Dual DS DA
16 8 18 240 2 2 4 6 5 8 57600 8640 130 1096 400 776
16 8 18 28 2 2 4 6 5 8 11520 1728 110 233 80 168
16 8 18 216 2 2 4 6 5 8 23040 3456 120 448 160 320
20 10 24 28 2 3 5 8 6 10 24960 3008 190 370 104 226
27 9 20 26 3 2 3 5 4 7 23328 1470 170 187 120 129
48 12 40 24 4 5 3 8 6 10 78720 2976 >600 340 164 114
50 10 42 24 5 5(2) 2 7 5 9 70560 2800 >600 240 180 104
Table 1: Examples of parameters for the RankSign signature scheme
implementation may reduce this cost.
7 Conclusion
We have introduced a new approach to devising signatures with coding theory and in par-
ticular in the rank metric, by proposing to decode both erasures and errors rather than
errors only. This approach enables one to return a small weight word beyond the Gilbert-
Varshamov bound rather than below. We proposed a new efficient algorithm for decoding
LRPC codes which makes this approach feasible. We then proposed a signature scheme
based on this algorithm and the full decoding of a random syndrome beyond the Gilbert-
Varshamov bound. We also showed that it was possible to protect our system against leakage
from authentic signatures. Finally, we propose different types of parameters, some of which
are decently small. The parameters we propose compare very well to other existing signature
schemes based on coding theory such as the CFS scheme for instance.
References
[1] Thierry P. Berger, Pierre-Louis Cayrel, Philippe Gaborit, Ayoub Otmani: Reducing
Key Length of the McEliece Cryptosystem. AFRICACRYPT 2009: 77-97
[2] Thierry P. Berger, Pierre Loidreau: Designing an Efficient and Secure Public-Key
Cryptosystem Based on Reducible Rank Codes. INDOCRYPT 2004: 218-229
[3] Luk Bettale, Jean-Charles Fauge`re, Ludovic Perret: Hybrid approach for solving
multivariate systems over finite fields. J. Mathematical Cryptology 3(3): 177-197
(2009)
[4] Razvan Barbulescu and Pierrick Gaudry and Antoine Joux and Emmanuel Thome´,
”A quasi-polynomial algorithm for discrete logarithm in finite fields of small charac-
teristic”, eprint iacr 2013/400
19
[5] http://www-polsys.lip6.fr/~bettale/hybrid
[6] Florent Chabaud, Jacques Stern: The Cryptographic Security of the Syndrome De-
coding Problem for Rank Distance Codes. ASIACRYPT 1996: 368-381
[7] Le´o Ducas, Phong Q. Nguyen: Learning a Zonotope and More: Cryptanalysis of
NTRUSign Countermeasures. ASIACRYPT 2012: 433-450
[8] Courtois N., Finiasz M. and Sendrier N. : How to achieve a McEliece based digital
signature scheme. Proc. of Asiacrypt 2001, Springer LNCS Vol. 2248, pp. 157–174
(2001)
[9] J.-C. Fauge`re, F. Levy-dit-Vehel, L. Perret. Cryptanalysis of MinRank. In CRYPTO
2008, LNCS 5157, pages 280–296. Springer Verlag, 2008.
[10] Jean-Charles Fauge`re, Mohab Safey El Din, Pierre-Jean Spaenlehauer: Computing
loci of rank defects of linear matrices using Gro¨bner bases and applications to cryp-
tology. ISSAC 2010: 257-264
[11] Jean-Charles Fauge`re, Ayoub Otmani, Ludovic Perret, Jean-Pierre Tillich: Algebraic
Cryptanalysis of McEliece Variants with Compact Keys. EUROCRYPT 2010: 279-
298
[12] Ernst M. Gabidulin, Theory of Codes with Maximum Rank Distance, Probl.
Peredachi Inf, (21), pp. 3-16 (1985).
[13] Ernst M. Gabidulin, A. V. Paramonov, O. V. Tretjakov: Ideals over a Non-
Commutative Ring and thier Applications in Cryptology. EUROCRYPT 1991: 482-
489
[14] P. Gaborit and G. Murat and O. Ruatta and G. Ze´mor, Low Rank
Parity Check Codes and their application in cryptography. Published in
Workshop Codes and Cryptography (WCC 2013), Bergen (available at
http://www.selmer.uib.no/WCC2013/pdfs/Gaborit.pdf)
[15] Philippe Gaborit, Julien Schrek, Gilles Ze´mor: Full Cryptanalysis of the Chen Iden-
tification Protocol. PQCrypto 2011: 35-50
[16] P. Gaborit, O. Ruatta and J. Schrek, On the complexity of the rank syndrome de-
coding problem, eprint, http://arxiv.org/abs/1301.1026
[17] P. Gaborit and G. Ze´mor, On the hardness of the decoding and the minimum distance
problems for rank codes, IEEE Trans. on Information Theory, IT-62, No 12 (2016)
pp. 7245–7252.
20
[18] Craig Gentry, Chris Peikert, Vinod Vaikuntanathan: Trapdoors for hard lattices and
new cryptographic constructions. STOC 2008: 197-206
[19] Oded Goldreich, Shafi Goldwasser, Shai Halevi: Public-Key Cryptosystems from
Lattice Reduction Problems. CRYPTO 1997: 112-131
[20] Jeffrey Hoffstein, Jill Pipher, Joseph H. Silverman: NTRU: A Ring-Based Public Key
Cryptosystem. ANTS 1998: 267-288
[21] Jeffrey Hoffstein, Nick Howgrave-Graham, Jill Pipher, Joseph H. Silverman, William
Whyte: NTRUSIGN: Digital Signatures Using the NTRU Lattice. CT-RSA 2003:
122-140
[22] F. Levy-dit-Vehel and L. Perret, Algebraic decoding of rank metric codes, proceedings
of YACC06.
[23] P. Loidreau, Properties of codes in rank metric, http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0610057
[24] J. MacWilliams and N.J.A. Sloane, ”The theory of error correcting codes”, North
Holland, Ninth impression (1977)
[25] Daniele Micciancio, Oded Regev, Lattice-based Cryptography Book chapter in Post-
quantum Cryptography, D. J. Bernstein and J. Buchmann (eds.), Springer (2008)
[26] Rafael Misoczki and Jean-Pierre Tillich and Nicolas Sendrier and Paulo S. L. M.
Barreto, MDPC-McEliece: New McEliece Variants from Moderate Density Parity-
Check Codes Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/409
[27] Ourivski, A. V. and Johansson, T., New Technique for Decoding Codes in the Rank
Metric and Its Cryptography Applications, Probl. Inf. Transm.(38), 237–246 (2002)
[28] Phong Q. Nguyen, Oded Regev: Learning a Parallelepiped: Cryptanalysis of GGH
and NTRU Signatures. EUROCRYPT 2006: 271-288
[29] D. Silva, Kschishang, R. Ko¨tter, “Communication over Finite-Field Matrix Channels,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 56, pp. 1296–1305, Mar. 2010.
[30] Stern J. : A new paradigm for public key identification. IEEE Transactions on Infor-
mation Theory, IT 42(6), pp. 2757–2768 (1996)
A Proof of Theorem 8
We give here a complete proof of Theorem 8. To prove the theorem we rely on the following
lemma:
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Lemma 10. Let A be a fixed subspace of GF (q)m of dimension α and let T be a subspace
of dimension t (with possibly t = 0) such that dim〈AT 〉 = αt. Let B be a subspace generated
by T together with β random independent uniform vectors, with β satisfying α(t + β) ≤ m.
Then
P (dim〈AB〉 < α(t+ β)) ≤
qα(t+β)
(q − 1)qm
.
Proof. Suppose first that B = B′ + 〈b〉 where b is a uniformly chosen random element of
GF (q)m and where B′ ⊃ T is a fixed space such that dim〈AB′〉 = α(t+ β − 1). Let AP be a
projective version of A, meaning that for every a 6= 0 in A, we have exactly one element of
the set
{λa, λ ∈ GF (q)∗}
in AP .
We have dim〈AB〉 < α(t+β−1)+α if and only if the subspace bA has a non-zero intersection
with 〈AB′〉, and also if and only if the set bAP has a non-zero intersection with 〈AB′〉. Now,
P
(
dim〈AB′〉 ∩Ab 6= {0}
)
≤
∑
a∈AP, a6=0
P
(
ab ∈ 〈AB′〉
)
(6)
=
|A| − 1
q − 1
qα(t+β−1)
qm
(7)
=
qα(t+β)
(q − 1)qm
−
qα(t+β−1)
(q − 1)qm
. (8)
since for any fixed a 6= 0, we have that ab is uniformly distributed in GF (q)m, and since the
number of elements in bAP equals (|A| − 1)/(q − 1).
Now write
B0 = T ⊂ B1 = T + 〈b1〉 ⊂ B2 = T + 〈b1, b2〉 ⊂ · · · ,⊂ Bi = T + 〈b1, . . . , bi〉 ⊂ · · · ⊂ B = Bβ
where b1 . . . , bβ are independent uniform vectors in GF (q)
m. We have that the probability
P (dim〈AB〉 < dimAdimB)
that AB is not full-rank is not more than
β∑
i=1
P (dim〈ABi〉 < dimAdimBi | dim〈ABi−1〉 = dimAdimBi−1)
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so that (8) gives:
P (dim〈AB〉 < dimAdimB) ≤
1
q − 1
β−1∑
i=0
(
1
qm−(t+i+1)α
−
1
qm−(t+i)α
)
(9)
≤
1
q − 1
(
1
qm−α(t+β)
−
1
qm−tα
)
≤
1
(q − 1)qm−α(t+β)
. (10)
We now give the proof of the theorem:
Proof of Theorem 8. To obtain a T -decodable syndrome, we must choose n− k elements in
a space 〈FE〉 for a given space E that contains T . There are E(T ) ways of choosing E, and
for any given E there are at most qdimF dimE = qdr ways of choosing a syndrome coordinate
in 〈FE〉. This gives the upper bound on T (t, r, d,m).
We proceed to prove the lower bound. First consider that Lemma 10 proves that, when we
randomly and uniformly choose a subspace E that contains T , then with probability at least
1− 1/(q − 1), we have:
dim〈(F−11 F + F
−1
2 F )E〉 = dim(F
−1
1 F + F
−1
2 F ) dimE = (2d − 1)r
by property (4). This last fact implies, that
dim(F−11 〈FE〉+ F
−1
2 〈FE〉) = 2dr − r (11)
since clearly
F−11 〈FE〉+ F
−1
2 〈FE〉 = 〈(F
−1
1 F + F
−1
2 F )E〉.
Now, since we have E ⊂ F−11 F ∩F
−1
2 F , applying the formula dim(A+B) = dimA+dimB−
dimA ∩B to (11) gives us simultaneously that:
dim〈FE〉 = dr
F−11 F ∩ F
−1
2 F = E.
In other words, both conditions (i) and (ii) of T -decodability are satisfied. We have therefore
proved that the proportion of subspaces E containing T that satisfy conditions (i) and (ii)
is at least (1 − 1/(q − 1)). Now let E be a fixed subspace satisfying conditions (i) and (ii).
Among all (n − k)-tuples of elements of 〈FE〉, the proportion of those (n − k)-tuples that
together with 〈FT 〉 generate the whole of 〈FE〉 is at least
(
1−
1
q
)(
1−
1
q2
)
. . .
(
1−
1
qi
)
. . . ≥ 1−
1
q − 1
. (12)
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We have therefore just proved that given a subspace E satisfying conditions (i) and (ii),
there are at least (1− 1/q)(qrd)n−k (n− k)-tuples of 〈FE〉n−k satisfying condition (iii).
To conclude, notice that since a T -decodable syndrome entirely determines the associated
subspace E, the set of T -decodable syndromes can be partitioned into sets of (n− k)-tuples
of 〈FE〉n−k satisfying condition (iii) for all E satisfying conditions (i) and (ii). The two
lower bounds on the number of such E and the number of T -decodable syndromes inside a
given 〈FE〉n−k give the global lower bound of the Theorem.
B Differential support attack
We now detail the differential support attack which uses the structure of the augmented
LRPC codes. The LRPC code H, used to build the signature, is hidden by some matrix S,P
and R. As well as any trapdoor cryptosystems, we can imagine a specific way to extract the
code H from the public key H ′ = S.(R|H).P . In this situation, H is defined by d matrices
H1 . . . Hd of size (n−k)×n in GF (q) such that Σ
d
l=1Hl.Fl = H. We will provide a specificity
of H ′ which leads to an exponential extractor of a representation of the code H permiting
to decode and forge a signature. We give the complexity of this extractor and use it as an
upper bound for the best attack in this cryptosystem.
First, notice that the code H has severals representations. Indeed, it is constructed using
H1 . . . Hd and F1 . . . Fd. Here we want to choose a canonical representation to simplify the
proof. For that purpose, we search for the n× n matrix P ′ instead of P in GF (q) such that
H ′ = S(R|Id.F1 . . . Id.Fd).P
′ with Id the identity matrix. We can find such a matrix because
the parameters are choosen such as d(n− k) = n and the matrix Hl have rank (n− k), with
1 ≤ l ≤ d. We can also choose, without loss of generality, a homogeneous form for F1, . . . , Fd
where F1 = 1. This can be deduced by swapping the matrices S and S.
1
F1
. Below we try to
extract a code H of the form (Id|Id.F2| . . . |Id.Fd).
In this paragraph we describe the vector space in GF (q) generated by the element in a
line of H ′. We set (Si,j)1≤i,j≤n−k for the coefficients of S and (Ri,j)(1≤i≤n−k)(1≤j≤t) for the
coefficients of R. The coefficient (i, j) of the matrix S.(R|H) can be expressed by :
• Σn−kp=1Si,pRp,j, if 1 ≤ j ≤ t
• Si,j−t, if t ≤ j ≤ t+ n− k
• . . .
• Si,j−k−tFd, if k + t ≤ j ≤ n+ t
Each element of the row i of the matrix S.(R|H) belongs to the GF (q)-vector space Vi =
〈Si,1F1, . . . , Si,n−kF1, . . . , Si,n−kFd, R1, . . . , Rt〉 with R1, . . . , Rt some coefficients depending
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on S and R. Eventually, the multiplication by the matrix P on the right does not change
that each element of the i-th row of H ′ belongs to the vector space Vi.
It is a priori difficult to retrieve an element Fl, 1 < l ≤ d, from one of the Vi. On the other
hand, we can verify that an element α is a Fl by computing Vi∩Vi.α
−1. If α is one of the Fl,
the intersection will be 〈Si,1, . . . , Si,n〉 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n−k. Then we can retrieve 〈F1, . . . , Fd〉
with the intersection ∪n−kp=1Vi.
1
Si,p
. As long as d is not a large number, it is not difficult to
extract the whole structure from that.
A simple way to find a Fl is to test any possibilities in GF (q
m) with the intersection described
before. We will see next a more efficient method which uses the repetition of the element Fl,
1 < l ≤ d, in the rows of the LRPC code H.
The search for one of the (Fl)1<l≤d is based on the search for an element x of one of the Vi
such that x = Σn−kj=1 λjSi,j.Fl, with λj in GF (q) and l 6= 1. We know that there exists another
element x′ = Σn−kj=1 λjSi,j.F1 in Vi. Hence, there exists a combination in the vector space Vi.
1
x
equal to 1
Fl
. This corresponds to a combination of elements in the row i of H. 1
x
which would
be equal to 1
Fl
. If we find a combination c ∈ GF (q)n+t such that H. 1
x
.cT = (v1, . . . , vn−k)
T
and vi =
1
Fl
for a particular i, then we have that vi =
1
Fl
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n − k. Indeed the
different Vi are built in a same way from H
′ and if a combination c gives Lic
T = Σn−kj=1 λjSi,j
with Li the row i of H
′ then we have by construction Lpc
T = Σn−kj=1 λjSp,j with the same λj .
Finally, to retrieve this combination c, we can look for c such that (L1.
1
x1
− L2.
1
x2
)cT = 0
where x1 is picked as random in V1 and x2 is generated with the same algorithm that x1 but
using V2.
We obtain a complexity based on the probability of randomly finding a useful element x:
q(n−k)(d−1)+t.
This point of view shows that even a specific attack on the hidden code H which uses all
its particularities will not succeed with well chosen parameters since the complexity remains
exponential. The invertible matrix P in GF (q) seems to sufficiently mix the vector spaces
Vi to make it difficult to recover a vector x which could allow one to extract the structure
of H.
C Proof of Theorem 9
Recall that a signature of a message M is a pair (x′, y′) where y′ is a hashed value of the
message M and y′ = H ′x′T and rank(x′) = r. If A is an algorithm that leads to a forgery
with the use of N authentic signatures, then the algorithm A′ consists of a simulated version
of A where authentic signatures (x′, y′) are replaced by couples (x′′, y′′) where x′′ is randomly
and uniformly chosen among vectors of rank-weight e, and y′′ = H ′x′′T is claimed to be the
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hashed value of the message M output by a random oracle. In the random oracle model,
the algorithm A′ must behave exactly as algorithm A and give the same output whenever
(x′′, y′′) is statistically indistinguishable from (x′, y′).
We now compare the statistics of (x′, y′) and (x′′, y′′). We have H ′ = A(R|H)P and since
the transformation:
(x′, y′) 7→ (xa = Px′, ya = A−1y′) (13)
(x′′, y′′) 7→ (xs = Px′′, ys = A−1y′′) (14)
is one-to-one, comparing the statistics of (x′, y′) and (x′′, y′′) amounts to comparing the
distributions of (xa, ya) (authentic) and (xs, ys) (simulated).
Now (xa, ya) is obtained in the following way: the signer chooses a subspace T of GF (qm)
together with a random vector τ ∈ T t of rank t and is given a vector u which is uniformly
distributed in the syndrome space GF (qm)n−k and is equal to A−1h(M) − RτT . Precisely,
the signer chooses a random vector τ of rank t, and sets T to be the subspace generated by
its coordinates. The signer then proceeds to try to decode u, meaning it looks for a subspace
E of GF (qm) that contains T and such that all coordinates of u fall into 〈FE〉, where F is
the space generated by the elements of the LRPC matrix H. He succeeds exactly when the
syndrome vector u is T -decodable in the sense of Definition 5: when this doesn’t occur, the
decoder aborts.
When the syndrome u is T -decodable, the decoder proceeds to solve the equation
HxTH = u (15)
and then sets
xa = (τ, xH)
to create the couple (xa, ya = (R|H)(xa)T ) in (13). Recall from Remark 1 in Section 3.2
that the matrix H has been chosen so that equation (15) (equivalently equation (1)) always
has a unique solution for every T -decodable u.
We may therefore speak about T -decodable couples (xH , u), where u uniquely determines xH
and xH uniquely determines u. Now, to re-cap, the authentic signer starts with uniformely
random u, and whenever u turns out to be non T -decodable, then we declare a decoding
failure and start the whole process again generating another τ , another random space T
and another u by another call to the random oracle h (meaning a counter appended to the
message M is incremented before applying the random hash again). This keeps happening
until we hit a T -decodable u. We see therefore that when it does hit a T -decodable u, the
couple
(xH , u)
is uniformly distributed among all T -decodable couples.
26
We now turn to the action of the simulator: what the simulator does is he tries to generate
a uniform T -decodable couple (xH , u) through xH rather than through u like the signer.
Specifically, the simulator starts with a random subspace E of GF (qm) of dimension r and an
x′′ with coordinates independently and uniformly drawn from E. Since the transformation
(14) x′′ 7→ xs = Px′′ is rank-preserving, the simulator is implicitely creating a uniform vector
xs of En. Write
xs = (τ, xH).
With overwhelming probability (at least 1− 1/qr−t), the vector τ ∈ Et is of maximum rank-
weight t, since its coordinates are independently and uniformly chosen in E. The vector τ
generates the required random space T . Let u = HxTH : note that by construction, all its
coordinates must be in 〈FE〉. Consider the conditions (i),(ii),(iii) of Definition 5 for u to be
T -decodable.
Remember that the first two conditions (i) and (ii) are properties only of the subspace E.
When they are not satisfied, no choice of xH can yield a T -decodable couple (xH , u). When
conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied we have that, since the mapping (15) xH 7→ u is invertible,
the vector u is a uniform random vector in 〈FE〉n−k. Since n−k+dim〈FT 〉 = dim〈FE〉, the
probability that condition (iii) is not satisfied is governed by the probability than a random
vector falls into a given subspace of 〈FE〉 of co-dimension 1 and is of the order of 1/q: it is
also at most 1/(q − 1) according to computation (12). We also see that the number of xH
that satisfies condition (iii) is independent of the space E and is always the same for all E
that satisfy conditions (i) and (ii). This last fact implies that when
• A random uniform subspace E is chosen among all possible subspaces E of dimension r,
• a random xH is chosen in E
n,
then either (xH , u) is not T -decodable, or (xH , u) is T -decodable and is uniformly distributed
among all T -decodable couples.
The simulator has no oracle to tell him when he has produced a non T -decodable couple,
he can only hope this doesn’t occur. As long as he produces T -decodable couples (xH , u),
then they are distributed (uniformly) exactly as those that are produced by the authentic
signer and are undistinguishable from them. If we call pi the probability that he produces a
non-decodable u, then he can reasonably expect to produce a list of approximately N = 1/pi
signatures (x′′, y′′) that are undistiguishable from genuine signatures in the random oracle
model.
Consider now the probability pi that the simulator produces a non-decodable u. It is at
most the sum of the probabilities that E does not satisfy (i) and (ii) and the probability
≤ 1/(q − 1) that (iii) is not satisfied. The probability that E does not satisfy (i) and (ii) is
at most the probability that the product space 〈(F−11 F + F
−1
2 )E〉 does not have maximal
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dimension (2d − 1)r, as argued in the proof of Theorem 8, and is at most 1/(q − 1). We
obtain therefore pi ≤ 1/(q − 1) + 1/(q − 1) = 2/(q − 1) ≈ 2/q which concludes the proof.
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